notion that the rights of these citizens are dependent on rules based on the regulation of property seems decidedly outmoded as we approach the twentyfirst century. 13 The underlying principle sustaining this outcome-that the Constitution does not follow the flag-has far-reaching consequences affecting mainstream Americans 4 and raises serious questions about the national commitment to democracy, equality, and self-determination.
As we face the 100th anniversary of the American annexation of Puerto Rico, the predominant issue that has been endlessly debated for a century by the local political leadership--the so-called "'status question"' -has gained new political life on the mainland. Bills have been introduced in Congress to resolve the status conundrum. Under the Young Bill,' 6 a congressionally sponsored referendum would be held in which the voters of Puerto Rico would choose between three status alternatives: some form of commonwealth status (yet to be defined), independence, and statehood. 7 It is in this context that Jos6 Trfas Monge has written his political history and blueprint for the island, 14. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. 494 US. 259. 268 (1990) (stating that "not esery constitutional provision applies to government activity even where the United States has sosereign power"). 15. E.g., SURENDRA BHANA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEVELoPmEr" OF THE Pt ERrO Rico STATUS QUESTION 1936 QUESTION -1968 QUESTION (1975 ; see also ROBERT ANDERSON. PARY POLITICS IN PLERTO RiCO (1965); PEDRO ALBIZU CAMPOS, OBRAS ESCOGIDAS 1923 -1936 (1975 . HAROLD J LIDI,. HISTORY OF'iTE This is a remarkable book written by the former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico,' 9 who is not only a noted constitutional scholar, 20 but most significantly was a major actor in the creation of that presently maligned entity, the "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." Much of the book is a comprehensive review of relevant Puerto Rican history, and thus it is valuable, at the very least, as a concise reference source for those who may otherwise be unfamiliar with the subject. The book's principal worth, however, lies elsewhere, and may be somewhat difficult to appreciate for those who are uninitiated in the Byzantine politics of Puerto Rico.
That Puerto Rico is, and has been since its annexation from Spain in 1898, a colony of the United States, is a central postulate of Trfas Monge's book. This conclusion is neither startling nor new, 2 ' but it is one that is not relished by most Americans, to whom the notion that we are in this day and age a colonial power is not only unpalatable but also is considered to be an outright historic anachronism. Nevertheless, this has been the consistent position of both statehood 22 3 " presumably because his principal intended audience was in Puerto Rico. The message reflected in his present book, however, would be largely wasted if directed at such an insular audience, and thus Trfas Monge switches to the language of those with the real power over Puerto Rico's destiny. Probably not coincidentally, the book's publication comes as Congress considers passage of the most far-reaching status-related legislation in recent history, the Young Bill. 3 To better explain the significance of Trfas Monge's book, and to highlight its strengths and weaknesses, I divide further commentary into three parts. Part I offers a brief history of the relationship between Congress, the courts, and Puerto Rico, paying special attention to the effects of Public Law 600, which created the current semi-autonomous Puerto Rican government structure. In Part II, I focus more specifically on Trfas Monge's book, discussing some aspects of Puerto Rican history that he surprisingly omits, and scrutinizing his proposals. In a brief conclusion, I argue that Puerto Rico requires an answer to the "status question" that serves two goals: finality and equality.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It is almost an aphorism that knowledge of the historical background of contemporary events is necessary to understand them. In the case of a book that deals with Puerto Rico's constitutional and political relationship to the United States, such as Trfas Monge's, however, I would go further to state that such antecedents are essential for a balanced appreciation of such a work. In offering historical background, however, I do not intend to displace the more comprehensive treatment of the topic that Trfas Monge himself provides. Instead, I limit myself to enumerating and commenting upon certain key events that have occurred since 1898 and that seem immediately relevant.
We thus find that on intermittent occasions throughout the last one hundred years, Puerto Rico's political status has been the subject of intense congressional debate and scrutiny. Indeed, as a result of Congress's pervasive control over all facets of insular affairs, Puerto Rico's political history can be segmented into a series of distinct epochs, each of which has commenced with the passage of leading legislation, followed by important judicial decisions interpreting them. With few exceptions, it has been the judiciary that has had an overwhelming impact on the fate of the territories.
A. The Foraker Act and the Insular Cases
The first period in this long trail began in 1900 with the enactment of the Foraker Act, 32 which provided for the establishment of a civil government for Puerto Rico, including a limited elected legislature, and a governor and supreme court appointed by the President of the United States. The so-called Insular Cases 33 followed, in which the Supreme Court created a distinction between what it labeled "incorporated" and "unincorporated" territories. Incorporated territories were those that, at the time of acquisition, were assured eventual statehood (e.g., Louisiana and Alaska), and in which the Constitution applied ex proprio vigore ("by its own force").-Such was not the case with unincorporated territories, for which no commitment of eventual statehood was made at the time of acquisition (e.g., the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam).
As to those territories, only those provisions of the Constitution deemed [T]he contention seems to be that if an organized and settled province of another sovereignty is acquired by the United States, Congress has the power to keep it, like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence for an indefinite period; and, more than that, that after it has been called from that limbo, commerce with it is absolutely subject to the will of Congress, irrespective of constitutional provisions. 39 To this Justice Harlan added:
Monarchical and despotic governments, unrestrained by written constitutions, may do with newly acquired territories what this Government may not do consistently with our fundamental law. To say otherwise is to concede that Congress may, by action taken outside of the Constitution, engraft upon our republican institutions a colonial system such as exists under monarchical governments. Surely such a result was never contemplated by the fathers of the Constitution.... The idea that this country may acquire territories anywhere upon the earth, by conquest or treaty, and hold them as mere colonies or provinces-the people inhabiting them to enjoy only such rights as Congress chooses to accord to them-is wholly inconsistent with the spirit and genius as well as with the words of the Constitution. 40 Such words, however, did not carry the day. Instead, Justice Brown's majority opinion opted in favor of congressional colonialism and against what it saw as the inevitable alternative, full citizenship for native Puerto Ricans . 4 The possibility of these "inhabitants . . . , whether savages or civilized," becoming citizens of the United States, and being "entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunity of citizens," the Court declared, would have "extremely serious" consequences. 42 "Indeed it is doubtful," Brown wrote, "if Congress would ever assent to the annexation of territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, however foreign they may be to our habits, traditions and modes of life, shall become at once citizens of the United States. 43 45 In addition to providing Puerto Ricans with a fully elected bicameral legislature, the Jones Act granted U.S. citizenship to the residents of Puerto Rico. 46 The high hopes that ensued for Puerto Rican equality and statehood, however, would not last long. Balzac v. Porto Rico 7 followed in 1922. In that decision, the Court, through Chief Justice Taft-a former President of the United States and the first colonial governor of the Philippines-ruled that the granting of citizenship to Puerto Ricans did not mean that Congress had expressed an intention of eventually incorporating Puerto Rico as a state. Instead, the Court ruled, the Act merely allowed the residents of Puerto Rico free entry into the United States, where they could exercise full rights as citizens. With this decision, the Supreme Court added to its approval of the colonial relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States embodied in the Insular Cases, the establishment of gradations in citizenship. Thus, under Balzac some citizens had, and have, "5 fewer rights than others, a situation reminiscent of that condoned by the Court's outcome in Plessy v. Ferguson. 49 As Trfas Monge indicates, "American citizenship was granted under the worst possible light," and "[in the next decade people's sense of unhappiness would grow, divisions would deepen, and the difference over the status problem would seem even more intractible."-'
C. Public Law 600
In part because of the disruption wrought by World War II, a relatively long period passed without Congress's attention being again focused on Puerto Rico's political relationship with the federal government. This benign neglect was interrupted by the passage in 1947 of the Elective Governor Act, 5 1 which provided that henceforth the governor of Puerto Rico would be chosen by popular vote but left control over appointments to the supreme court and to the position of Auditor of Puerto Rico in the hands of the U.S. President. Soon afterwards, the most expansive legislation to date, Public Law 600,52 was passed. Public Law 600 allowed Puerto Ricans to write their own constitution, subject to congressional approval, and created a so-called "Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." The import of this statute has remained the subject of the most intense debate 53 in Puerto Rico's political history and of numerous court decisions at all levels of the federal judicial structure. No definitive interpretation of Public Law 600 has yet emerged. 4 The issues raised by the enactment of Public Law 600-whether Congress and the people of Puerto Rico entered into a bilateral pact through passage of the law, whether Congress 6 ' a situation that Trfas Monge politely describes as "having a dampening effect on efforts to break new ground. 62 Based on this evidence, it is difficult to conclude that Public Law 600 created a bilateral pact or changed the status of Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory under Congress's plenary power.
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A noted constitutional scholar has described the "Commonwealth" notion and the "compact" theory as follows: Though the formal title has been changed, in constitutional theory Puerto Rico remains a territory. This means that Congress continues to possess plenary but unexercised authority over Puerto Rico. Constitutionally, Congress may repeal Public Law 600, annul the Constitution of Puerto Rico and veto any insular legislation which it deems unwise or improper. From the perspective of constitutional law the compact between Puerto Rico and Congress may be unilaterally altered by the Congress. The compact is not a contract in a commercial sense. It expresses a method Congress chose to use in place of direct legislation .... Constitutionally, the most meaningful view of the Puerto Rican Constitution is that it is a statute of Congress which involves a6partial and non-permanent abdication of Congress' territorial power.
So far all that existed was little known legislative history, and much political rhetoric. The supporters of Commonwealth status needed legitimization of their allegedly new political framework. We thus come upon the Mora decision-the legal anchor to which many of the subsequent key events regarding the "compact" theory are affixed.
B. The Bootstrapping of Mora
As Trfas Monge points out, the existence of a bilateral compact between Puerto Rico and the United States as a result of the enactment of Public Law 600 was rejected not only by several of the major congressional participants in this process, but initially, also by the Interior and State Departments. 65 The U.S. government changed its position in 1953, when the United States's delegation to the United Nations unambiguously represented to the United Nations that it was no longer required to file annual reports on Puerto Rico pursuant to Article 73(e) of the U.N. Charter because Puerto Rico was now a self-governing entity. 66 The change in Puerto Rico's status, the delegates explained, was the result "of a compact of a bilateral nature whose terms [could] be changed only by common consent. ' TORRUELLA, supra note 21, at 160-6 1.
66. Article 73 of the charter of the United Nations requires any "(m]embers of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities" for the administration of territories which have not attained a "full measure of self-govemment" to file reports to the United Nations regarding said territories. U.N. CIARTER art. 73. The United States commenced filing reports on Puerto Rico in June 1947, and was required to do so through November 1953. See TRIAS MONGE, supra note 18, at 136. or why the government of the United States had .,uch a radical change of heart on this crucial subject. This is an especially puzzLing lapse considering Trfas Monge's dedicated participation in bringing about this change.
COMMITT-EE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 83D CONG., REPORT BY HON. FRANCES P. BOLTON AND HON. JAMES P. RICHARDS ON THE EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED
As I have previously mentioned, both Trfas Monge and Abe Fortas had been key players in the creation of Puerto Rico's Commonwealth status through the passage of Public Law 600.6' They were, in fact, instrumental in preparing the preamble to Public Law 600, which includes the "in the nature of compact" language that has been the source of so much contention. 6 " Both were also directly involved in the Mora trial and subsequent appeal, which provided the immediate setting to the State Department's startling change of heart. 7°T he Mora case concerned a shipment of rice from California to Puerto Rico. When the shipment arrived at the island, the Puerto Rico government subjected it to a price control order. The importer sought to enjoin enforcement of the order, claiming that it violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the Interstate Commerce Clause. The case was tried before Benjamfn Ortiz, an associate justice of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. who had been appointed acting district court judge for the United States District Court of Puerto Rico while the regular district court judge was on leave, a procedure that was permissible at the time pursuant Eight of the thirteen pages of the Mora opinion deal with the "compact" allegedly created by Public Law 600," 3 a question whose resolution was not necessary to a decision of the issues before that court. Furthermore, although Justice Ortiz found that there were "surprising[ly] ... few references to the subject" by "Congress relative to the existence of a compact," 74 this irrefutable conclusion did not stop him from holding that Congress had "grant[ed its plenary powers] away through a compact with the people of Puerto Rico., 75 Within two weeks of the opinion's publication on June 19, 1953, 76 Trfas Monge, together with Resident Commissioner Antonio Fern6s Isern, met with Benjamin Gehrig of the Department of Interior. On the basis of Mora, they were able to convince Gehrig that the "compact" argument should be used by the United States delegation in support of its position before the United Nations that there was no longer a need to file reports on Puerto Rico.
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On July 24, 1953, just over a month after the district court's opinion was rendered, Chief Judge Magruder issued the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the denial of a temporary injunction by the district court. 7 ' His opinion, however, was equivocal on the status issue, referring to "the compact '79 while cautioning that its true nature "deserv[ed] careful study and consideration.,, 0 On August 27, 1953, the United States Delegate to the United Nations, Mason Sears, indicated the following to the General Assembly's Committee on Information from Non-Self Governing Territories regarding the position of the United States on Puerto Rico:
A most interesting feature of the new constitution is that it was entered into in the nature of a compact between the American and Puerto Rican people. A compact, as you know, is far stronger than a treaty. A treaty can be denounced by either side, whereas a compact cannot be denounced by either party unless it has the permission of the other. 8 When the matter came before the General Assembly on November 27, 1953, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., made the so-called -Eisenhower Declaration," to which Trfas Monge refers in his book,s the result of which was the approval of the Fourth Committee's recommended resolution by a 26-16 vote, with 18 abstentions (this time with the United States voting in favor of the resolution)., 7 The United States thus ceased filing reports for Puerto Rico and to the present date has not resumed filing them.
Considering Trfas Monge's participation in the "'creation" of the "commonwealth" status and its aftermath, including the Mora episode and the resulting representations before the United Nations, his open confession that all of these endeavors did not change Puerto Rico's colonial condition constitutes a reason for puzzlement and admiration. At a minimum, Trfas Monge's revelation is an act of intellectual bravery." 8 The bravery of Trias Monge's history aside, the solutions the book offers to the cutting of Puerto Rico's Gordian knot are disquieting. With an eye to influencing the committees set to hear the Young Bill, Trfas Monge shifts gears in the later chapters to argue in favor of what, in Puerto Rican political parlance, is commonly referred to as "enhanced" or "culminated" commonwealth status. ' Under enhanced commonwealth status, a bilaterally binding compact would be negotiated between the United States and Puerto Rico, 9 " the terms of which would probably include continued United States citizenship for residents of Puerto Rico, a common defense and currency, and inclusion of the island within the United States's customs union. Additionally, Puerto Rico would have the right to veto the application to Puerto Rico of laws passed by Congress, would have separate representation in various international entities, the right to negotiate commercial treaties separate from the United States, and would have control over immigration into Puerto Rico. 91 This is all, to a large extent, historical d6jl vu. "Culminated commonwealth" seems surprisingly similar to the status that Puerto Rico had under the Spanish Autonomic Charter, created by a decree of the Spanish prime minister on November 25, 1897, eight months to the day before American troops landed in Gugnica. 92 More important than the feeling of d6jt vu, however, is the open question of whether a binding, bilateral pact between Puerto Rico and the United States is constitutionally possible. If Congress approves such a procedure, the U.S. Supreme Court will have to resolve the issue. 93 Thus, although Trfas Monge's discussion of the British, French, and Dutch Caribbean experiences 94 is of academic interest, they have limited practical application to Puerto Rico given the significant differences between the constitutional framework of those countries and that of the United States. Similarly, Trfas Monge's comparison to the various Micronesian alternatives 5 also appears to be of superficial value, given that the United States has never claimed sovereignty over these islands 96 and that they were not legally considered to be either territories or possessions of the United States under the Constitution. 97 The Northern Mariana Covenant, 98 which appears to grant the Northern Mariana Islands a "culminated" type of commonwealth status, also may raise issues of constitutional and international law, particularly given the decolonization standards of the United Nations." The United States's presence in these islands is a legacy of United Nations trusteeship," U a trusteeship authority that the Security Council terminated in 1990. Similar defects may plague the so-called compacts of free association negotiated with the other trust territories: the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.' 0 1 Again, these are issues that the Supreme Court will ultimately have to address.
The full scope of U.S. relations with these territories, while in keeping with the main thrust of Trias Monge's book, is beyond the scope of this Review. Nevertheless, some brief observations are appropriate. Trias Monge makes a poignant and forceful argument for true self-determination, ' " 2 with a detailed analysis of how Puerto Rico's state of affairs has come about.' He is also not shy-and in my opinion, is correct-in placing the blame for this condition on both Puerto Rico and the United States."" Trfas Monge calls for civility and balance in considering the status issue, which is the most divisive of issues in Puerto Rican life. This invitation is both timely and optimistic, and is one that is certainly much needed. Trfas Monge's ecumenical vision would require that the major players in all the political parties involved put aside many deep-seated views and prejudices. Realistically, however, it is hard to imagine that this will happen in the near future, particularly without congressional prodding for a definitive resolution of Puerto Rico's status. pathetic parody of democracy within the halls of that most democratic of institutions, but also a poignant reminder that Puerto Rico is even more of a colony now than it was under Spain. At various times during Spain's reign, the island had full voting rights and representation in the Spanish parliament.' t 6
The expectations first created by General Nelson A. Miles when he led America's invading forces in 1898 and proclaimed that he was bringing to Puerto Rico "the cause of liberty, justice and humanity, 10 7 have been followed by disappointments, not to say deceptions," 8 perpetrated on a whole people; these have not only had a lasting effect within the legal and constitutional parameters of the Puerto Rico-United States relationship, but also have had a substantial deleterious impact on the psyche and social fiber of Puerto Rico's population." This is not a merely rhetorical statement. There is a respected body of both scientific and nonscientific literature to the effect that perception of political and cultural inferiority can be related to mental illness." 0 A study conducted by a commission appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico in 1976, headed by psychiatrist Dr. Michael Woodbury, concluded that mental illness was the top health problem in Puerto Rico, causing about one-third of all chronic conditions."' Additionally, epidemiological studies on the mental health of Puerto Ricans confirm a high incidence of mental illness among the members of this ethnic group in comparison to all United States residents." 2 Dr. H6ctor R. Bird," 3 in a paper presented to the American Academy of Psychoanalysis in December 1980, declared that the "state of Puerto Rican society is one of identity diffusion and identity confusion ... directly or indirectly related to the colonial status and to the absence of. . . 'mutually supportive psychosocial equilibrium' to which identity conflicts evidently contribute."" 4 It is his hypothesis, one which I share as a matter of logic, "that the effects of colonialism in the societal system can be some of the determinants that filter down and influence the psychic configuration of the individuals in that society."" 5 It seems to me beyond argument that, at very least, the colonial condition suffered by the people of Puerto Rico, and eloquently denounced by Trfas Monge, is harmful to the self-esteem of this community. Ultimately, however, Puerto Rico's second-class status within the American polity is not only harmful to the 3.7 million citizens of the United States that reside there. It is denigrating to the nation as a whole. While we are unlikely to see a solution to the "status problem" that pleases all Puerto Ricans (or, for that matter all members of Congress), we must approach a solution with some degree of finality. In addition to suffering from feelings of inequality, Puerto Rico is hindered by the constant perception that its political status might change in some undefined manner and without its residents' participation. As Trfas Monge vehemently argues, the United States must make up its mind as to what it is willing to do regarding Puerto Rico's future, for on the Puerto Rican side there is almost unanimous agreement on one fact: The present status is unacceptable. As Trfas Monge points out, there are various paths Congress may opt to follow. At this stage, we do not know the full extent to which these paths may fit the constitutional scheme of the United States, or whether they are politically acceptable to Congress. Nevertheless, one thing is clear: After one hundred years of sometimes-beneficial American colonialism, it is best for all concerned to break the present logjam at the earliest possible moment. Too much time and energy continue to be wasted on the perpetual recurrence of status uncertainty; once this central question is resolved, we can turn our attention to the business that truly calls, the business of self-government.
One need not agree with Trfas Monge on all points to recognize the genuine contribution that his book makes. Most importantly, it may serve the noble purpose of bringing to the attention of the American people the plight of their fellow citizens in Puerto Rico.
